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Abstract — Power industry is undergoing restructuring 
throughout the world. The traditional vertically monopolistic 
structure has been deregulated and replaced by gencos, 
transcos and discos with competition introduced to gencos 
and discos in order to reach higher efficiency in electricity 
production and utilization. A lot of power markets have been 
established for the purpose. However for different countries, 
the principal objectives and considerations of power system 
deregulation are different. In this paper special 
considerations on power system deregulation of developing 
countries in Asia are discussed. Two regional power markets 
in China are used as examples. It is shown that for 
developing countries, the main objectives of power system 
deregulation are to attract various investments to power 
industry in order to meet the fast growth of electric demand 
caused by blooming economy and in the meantime to reduce 
government commitment and functions in power industry. 
Only this way, the power industry, as a significant 
infrastructure, can realize sustainable development at high 
efficiency. It is also shown that in the market environment, 
how to realize optimal system planning and reliable 
operation at acceptable electricity prices with qualifies 
service and how to transit to the market environment 
smoothly at lowest costs and lowest risks should be 
considered thoroughly. 
Index Terms – Power System Deregulation, Power 
Markets. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
ower industry is undergoing restructuring throughout 
the world[1-7]. The traditional vertically monopolistic 
structure has been deregulated and replaced by gencos, 
transcos and discos with competitions introduced to 
gencos and discos in order to reach higher efficiency in 
electricity production and utilization. A lot of R&D work 
has been conducted on power markets[8-14]. However for 
different countries, the principal objectives and 
considerations of power system deregulation are different. 
In the developed countries, areas with higher electricity 
prices would like to introduce competitions so that 
electricity prices are able to reduce and social welfare can 
be maximized. In some countries, electric power supply 
sector is  a regulated public utility,  and the government  
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would like to privatize the electric power industry so as to 
reduce government commitment and functions. In this 
regard, gencos, transcos and discos are formed with 
competition introduced to gencos and discos to stimulate 
their incentives in efficiency improvement. When 
efficiency grows up and electricity price goes down, it can 
in turn promote GDP growth. In the developing countries, 
the power system deregulation and power markets are to 
establish fair competition among gencos so as to 
encourage investments to power industry from various 
resources, such as foreign investments, local investments 
and IPPs etc. The diversified resources attracted to power 
industry can well meet the requirement of fast growing 
electricity demand induced by blooming economy in the 
developing countries. This might be the main reason for 
Asian developing countries to promote deregulation in 
power systems. 
Although power system deregulation is widely 
conducted in the world, it is not easy to successfully reach 
the initial targets set for the deregulation. Both 
experiences and lessons are obtained in practice. 
Considering that power industry is a significant 
infrastructure and in order to realize sustainable 
development of power systems at high efficiency, how to 
realize optimal system planning and reliable operation at 
acceptable electricity prices with qualifies service and 
how to transit to the market environment smoothly at 
lowest costs and lowest risks should be considered 
thoroughly in the market environment. This is actually an 
important task for the developing countries in Asia. 
In this paper, special considerations on power system 
deregulation of developing countries in Asia are discussed 
in section II. Two regional power markets in China are 
used as examples and described in section III. 
Conclusions are drawn in section IV. 
 
II.  CONSIDERATIONS ON POWER SYSTEM DEREGULATION 
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  
 
A.  Targets of deregulation 
In Asian developing countries, power systems are 
usually owned by the state or provincial government 
before deregulation and operated as a vertical monopoly. 
Unified dispatch is applied to individual power grids with 
limited power exchange to external grids. Hence the 
interconnections among grids are relatively weak. 
Because of fast economic development, the electricity 
P
 demand is growing rapidly and the power system 
expansion becomes a severe economic burden of the 
governments and a bottleneck of overall economy 
sustainable development. Investments from companies 
other than governments to power systems through 
approaches such as Build-Operation-Transfer (BOT) etc. 
are not so attractive. It is urgent to launch power system 
restructuring and deregulation and to establish power 
markets with fair competition so as to attract more 
investments from various resources to power industry. 
Moreover it is found that in some countries the 
monopolistic operation of power systems can also leads to 
low efficiency and even corruption for non-transparency 
and lack of surveillance in operation. It is clear that the 
power market is able to solve most of the problems 
appropriately. 
Based on the facts mentioned above, the targets of 
power system deregulation and power market 
establishment in Asian developing countries can be 
outlined as follows with certain priority. 
* To attract various investments to power systems 
through open-access and fair competition so that power 
supply can meet the fast growth of demand in developing 
countries. 
* To reduce government commitment to power 
industry, which is a severe burden to the governments of 
developing countries concerning huge amount of 
investment to the infrastructure construction; and to 
mitigate government functions in power industry so that 
the government can focus attention to significant issues of 
entire society. 
* To encourage efficient electricity production and 
utilization through competition and electricity pricing 
mechanism. The energy resources can be saved. The 
production costs can be reduced and hopefully the 
electricity price can decrease. It can in turn increase social 
welfare and benefit to national GDP growth. Thus 
sustainable development of power industry can be 
realized. 
* Through competition, the market clearing price 
(MCP) of electricity can provide clear economic 
information for future power system development use; 
power supply services can be improved; gencos’ profits 
may increase through higher operation efficiency; and the 
government tax return from power industry can be raised.  
However the realization of the targets are not easy 
because power system deregulation involves the benefits 
of various parties and each party will try hard to protect its 
own interests and add influence to the power market 
policies and rules. To keep a large genco can make it 
possess noticeable market power to get more profits. To 
define a MCP with or without congestion management 
consideration will lead to totally different profit 
distributions. To organize a small provincial market or a 
large regional power market may bring about significantly 
different social welfare. In order to construct power 
markets with fairness, justice and transparency, thorough 
considerations should be made to various aspects, which 
will be discussed below. 
 
B.  Considerations on the scheme of power system 
deregulation 
The overall power market scheme is usually considered 
by the government. It includes several aspects described 
below. 
* According to the targets set for deregulation, it is 
very important for the government to consider carefully at 
the beginning on: how many markets should be organized 
throughout the country; who should be responsible to 
organize the power markets, how to organize gencos, 
transcos and discos; what are their functions; who is 
responsible for market operation and/or system operation; 
how to develop market rules; who is responsible for 
market surveillance; how to transit from current regulated 
market to future competitive market; etc. A timetable 
should also be developed for execution. It is clear that a 
lot of negotiations and government decisions should be 
made at this level in order to make deregulation process 
successful. International consultant might be helpful, 
however for the different economic and technical 
backgrounds, it is more important to rely on own 
conditions and experts to make final decision. 
* After the fundamental decisions in launching the 
deregulation, the market rule development is a key step. A 
lot of lessons have been obtained in this aspect. For 
developing countries, copying power market rules of other 
countries or other markets such as natural gas etc. might 
lead to severe results. The market rules should be different 
from market to market with only principles unchanged. 
Therefore all market participants (suppliers, consumers, 
brokers, operators etc.) should have rights to join or 
examine rule development with consideration on all 
economic, technical and physical backgrounds, conditions 
and trends. The rule should try to be a perfect set on 
market organization, market functions, goods to be 
exchanged and services to be provided, sub-markets 
definition (futures, forward, option, day-ahead, and 
balancing markets for electricity as well as the markets for 
transmission service and ancillary service, etc.), pricing 
mechanism, participants and relevant regulation, market 
operation and system operation rules under normal and 
emergency cases, settlement, surveillance, etc. The rule 
should be revised from time to time to meet new requests 
and evolve gradually.  
* Another important task in power market operation is 
to develop a reliable computer supporting system to 
manage bilateral contract records, day-ahead market 
bidding and MCP - power selling/buying calculation, 
congestion management, and market information 
announcement etc. 
It should be pointed out that different markets have 
different potential risks in operation, to which special 
 attentions should be paid. The issue is discussed below. 
 
C.  Consideration on risks and their mitigations 
To realize successful running of the power markets, a 
significant issue is to examine carefully the potential risks 
existing in a specific power market. The risks include 
natural resource types, amount and relevant risks, 
economic development in the market area, gencos and 
consumers’ features, grid characteristics, potential market 
power, risk in power markets of single-buyer mode, 
special reliability and security issues in power system 
operation, power system planning/expansion in market 
environment, possibility of power exchange with adjacent 
power markets and relevant issues, and possible local 
government interference, etc. 
For a power market operating very well for years, we 
should not say the market is perfect until it operates very 
well under extremely severe market conditions and can 
also keep power system sustainable and efficient 
development for a relatively longer time horizon.  
Some risks, which are often appeared in the developing 
countries, will be discussed in a little bit detail below. 
Unbalanced economic development within the market 
area. When a power market covers both rural area and 
industrial area, the power generation in rural area usually 
has lower electricity price than that in industrial area if 
there is no power exchange between the two areas or if 
special price policy is applied to the rural consumers. 
When they are in the same market, discriminating price or 
proper measures should be taken to protect rural area 
consumers. Otherwise, industrial area users would like to 
sign bilateral contract with gencos in rural area at lower 
prices and the electricity price in that area will rise and 
have negative impacts to rural users. 
Hydraulic resource and hydrothermal dispatch in 
market environment. When a certain area has a higher 
hydraulic capacity ratio and/or the hydraulic resources 
should also be used for navigation, irrigation and flood 
control purposes controlled by the government agent, the 
risk of hydraulic power generation may occur. Basically 
there are several ways to dispatch hydropower: central 
dispatch with priority for hydropower taking care of peak 
load to maximize social welfare, thus all hydro power can 
get maximum benefits. However this might have negative 
impacts on thermal power generation profits especially 
when water resource is rich in certain years. However if 
hydraulic power plants bid in the same way as thermal 
power plants, the hydraulic resources might not be used 
efficiently. Besides some compensation should be 
provided to hydraulic power plants for their loss caused 
by diversified usages of water resources. Therefore certain 
rules should be developed to manage the case to make 
both thermal and hydraulic power companies have proper 
profits with incentives to make further investment to the 
power markets when load grows. 
Market power. When a market has few power 
generation companies, the company with large market 
share is able to control the price and get high profits from 
it. Such market power is harmful to consumers and may 
reduce social welfare noticeably. Therefore market share 
and/or capacity limits should be applied to any gencos. 
Grid congestion is another source of market power. 
Improperly defined transmission rights or congestion 
management rules can be utilized by market participants 
and strengthen the locational market power. In peak load 
condition or when large units are under maintenance, 
some machines become ‘must-run’, the market power can 
be severe. In addition to well-defined market rules to 
manage congestion and mitigate market power, market 
power existence and severity should be supervised 
constantly. Market surveillance and certain penalty should 
be applied to solve the issue. 
Reliable and secure power system operation under 
market environment. This is the most significant issue in 
deregulation. The power system deregulation should not 
sacrifice the system operation reliability and security. 
However the risk does exist. Lots of reasons can cause the 
issue, such as lack of reserve capacity, lack of reactive 
power supply and voltage control, poor organization of 
real-time power balancing market, poor emergency 
control and restorative control, wrong load forecasting 
and/or poor generation and transmission expansion 
planning which in turn leads to inadequacy of capacity, 
etc. In developing country, the grid construction may lag 
behind the generator installation and the resultant stressed 
network may cause severe problems under large and small 
disturbances.  
Centralized dispatch is highly recommended in such 
case to make full use of system-wide resources to avoid 
system instability and collapse. In principle, the economic 
issue such as various transactions should be determined 
by market rules before real time operation. Even if the 
resource/service is used/provided in real-time, it should be 
scheduled beforehand regarding to time, price, quantity, 
and the way to use/provide. However secure and reliable 
system operation should be realized in real-time 
absolutely through central dispatch and control and the 
system operator should have the authority to make 
decision according to load demand, power quality and 
security requests etc. under normal and emergency 
conditions. The difference of system operation with or 
without power market existence is that in power markets 
the operator should dispatch/use the available resource 
according to bilateral contracts, day-ahead market, 
ancillary service market outcomes determined beforehand.  
Considering former monopolistic operation condition, 
existing EMS and operation experience, it is 
recommended to have two computer systems for market 
operation and system operation respectively but with 
real-time link to each other for information exchange, 
software/database sharing and necessary mutual support. 
The same institute will manage both computer systems to 
realize cost-effective operation and well coordination. A 
 system operator should get some training on market 
operation and vice versa so that he/she can understand the 
impacts of market environment on system operation very 
well. 
Electricity pricing and demand elasticity. Pricing is a 
core issue in power markets. Bidding strategies are 
worked out base on pricing mechanism. For most power 
markets, MCP is used to determine day-ahead market 
price and electricity production amounts, which are then 
revised according to congestions if any. If the pay-as-bid 
principle is used in spot pricing, the ISO of a single buyer 
market can get significant benefits.  
A disco, who buys electricity from the market and sell 
it to the end users, may suffer from fixed electricity price 
for end users. The load elasticity is very important in 
power markets. Market failure might happen when the 
energy supply price is extremely high while end user can’t 
see it. 
Other merchandises in power markets should have 
their prices well defined as well. However at the 
beginning stage, the market rules should be simple and 
practical. Some services, such as reactive power supply 
and voltage control, reserve capacity, AGC etc. can be 
considered as a whole by the ISO and then distribute the 
cost to users as a lumped ‘uplift’. The users’ bill will not 
show the price for each service. This can be improved 
gradually when the technology is mature. 
Smooth transition to the market environment. This is 
also an important point in deregulation. A violent 
transition should be avoided. Usually when a market has 
adequate generation capacity and the supply is a little 
greater than demand, it is a good time to start power 
markets. The price will be smooth in transition and market 
rules can be tested under normal conditions first. 
Operators can practise in the real market environment. In 
this case, reliable and secure system operation can usually 
be ensured. Otherwise risk will appear in the test 
operation of power markets. 
Power system planning in market environment. Under 
market environments, generation and transmission 
network expansion are vital to power industry sustainable 
development. Accurate load and fuel price forecasting and 
correct estimation of profits are very important. 
Government policy and market rules in power system 
planning also play an important role in system expansion. 
In order to attract enough generation investments, a key 
point to developing countries, some rules with bias to 
gencos have to be applied. A typical price policy is 
two-part electricity price including capacity price and 
energy price, which can greatly reduce gencos’ risks in 
capital return and encourage generation investments 
effectively. This price policy is now used in NE China 
regional power market. In the meantime, to let grid 
company (which may also be the operator of both power 
market and power system) have enough income as 
transmission network capital return and for future 
development, transmission service price can be set at a 
relatively higher level.  
In power system planning, it is important to have an 
authorized institute to make centralized optimal planning 
with participation of market participants based on the 
information of economic development, load forecasting, 
energy resources available etc. Interested companies can 
then bid for power plant expansion and construction. 
However the transmission network expansion is a problem 
since it is difficult to get investment back in a short period 
through transmission service charge. The incentives to 
invest transmission line construction are therefore unclear. 
And the stressed network may lead to system instability 
under disturbances and even blackout under cascaded 
faults. Special measures and policies should be applied to 
solve the problem. 
 
D.  Other considerations 
To ensure fairness, justice and transparency in market 
competition, government should have minimum 
interference to the markets. But special purpose 
committees can be organized to manage the overall power 
industry policy, energy planning and investment 
consideration, market surveillance, etc.  
The market rules should also define duties, rights and 
benefits of individual market participants; include 
extraordinary operations of markets such as emergency 
stop, termination and re-start conditions and procedures.  
In order to promote power exchange and obtain more 
economic benefits and social welfare, transaction between 
markets are highly encouraged which include 
hydrothermal coordination across the markets, emergency 
support to reduce reserve capacity cost, and 
peak-load-time-difference utilization, etc.  
In certain area, special policies on electricity tariff are 
applied to special users, such as compensation to rural 
area users and special local industry, etc. These policy 
may exist at the beginning stage of power markets. It will 
be reduced and eliminated gradually when market is 
mature. 
In general power system deregulation is a kind of 
‘system engineering’, which is relevant to various aspects 
including economy, politics, society, engineering and 
technology. The success of power system deregulation 
will have great impacts on overall society and national 
economic development. 
 
III.  POWER MARKETS IN NE AND NW CHINA 
 
China is a developing country in Asia with fast 
economic development in recent years. By the end of 
2004, the total generation capacity reaches 447 GW, 
ranking at No. 2 in the world. Its electricity is still in short 
for the fast blooming economy. 
 Huge population, fast economic development and 
electricity demand growth cause severe burden of the 
government under traditional vertically monopolistic 
operation mode, in which the government is responsible 
for the investment of main power plants and transmission 
grids. In order to attract diversified resources to invest 
power industry, power system deregulation and power 
market establishment to ensure fair competition is the best 
and sustainable way to solve the problem. 
The main steps in power system deregulation in China 
are as follows[15-18]. In Dec. 1998, the State Council of 
China announced to launch power industry reform in 
China. In the first stage, the restructuring was focus on 
forming independent power companies and grid 
companies. Five provincial power markets and Shanghai 
power market were built up and tested as pioneers. 
Competition was introduced to gencos and the markets 
were in the single buyer mode. However the provincial 
power markets only covered small areas, which strongly 
limited the power exchange across the provinces and the 
goal of optimal use of resources over a wide region could 
not be realized. In Feb. 2002, the State Council of China 
announced a new document of ‘The Scheme of Power 
System Reform’. In this document, it is declared that to 
form regional power markets will be the future direction 
of power industry restructuring in China. In Dec. 2002, 
two independent grid companies were formed. They are S. 
China Grid Company and the State Grid Company. The 
latter includes 5 regional grid companies. They are 
Northeast, Northwest, N. China, E. China and Central 
China Grid Companies. The traditional government 
owned power plants were reformed into five 
generation-group companies with their individual shares 
in each regional power market less than 20%. In Mar. 
2003, the State Power Market Surveillance Commission 
(SPSC) started to work. Under the leadership of SPSC, 
Northeast and East China regional power markets were 
built up and committed to test operation in Jan. and May 
of 2004 respectively. In the meantime all original 
provincial power markets were asked to stop operation. 
Other regional grid companies are actively making R&D 
to ensure well design and optimal operation of future 
regional power market and avoid any potential risks. 
The power market in NE China and R&D work in NW 
China will be discussed below. 
 
A.  Northeast Regional Power Market in China 
The Northeast region covers three provinces 
(Hei-long-jiang, Ji-lin and Liao-ning) of NE China and 
East of Inner-Mongolia with the population of 100M and 
generation capacity of 41GW (85% thermal power and 
15% hydropower) at the end of 2003. The rich coalmines 
in the north and heavy load in the south cause a long 
transmission corridor from N. to S. of the region. In 
addition, a short power transmission corridor exists in 
mid-region from west (thermal power) and east (hydraulic 
power) to central part. The NE has been interconnected to 
N. China to sell their electricity. 
From the Northeast Regional Power Market, we can 
see some rules which are typically defined based on 
developing country conditions and significant to secure 
operation and sustainable development. 
* The NE Grid Company owns the regional 
transmission network and runs the regional power market 
and power system in parallel. It is also responsible for 
organizing generation planning and transmission planning 
according to the load forecasting although the Grid 
Company is not responsible for the construction of power 
plants. 
* The NE Grid Company keeps main hydraulic power 
plants in hand (10% in capacity) for frequency control and 
peak load dispatch to avoid sky-high prices under heavily 
loading conditions. 
* Two-part electricity pricing is used, in which 
capacity price and energy price are separate. The capacity 
price is defined by the State Tariff Department, while 
energy price is generated through competition. This is 
good to encourage future investment in power generation 
and solve sunk-cost issue. 
* The market in its first stage adopts single buyer 
mode. For long-term contract, pay-as-bid rule is applied 
for settlement, which can protect the benefits of the grid 
company and consumers. For day-ahead spot market, 
MCP is used. In general major energy transactions are 
through forward contract (round 80-90% of total power 
exchange); only a small amount is exchanged through spot 
market. Besides the generation option market is under 
organization to reduce gencos’ risks. 
* All transmission and ancillary services are centrally 
dispatched and the cost is distributed to consumers as a 
‘transmission cost’ in average cost nature, which is also 
examined by the state Tariff Department. In order to avoid 
high service price, each power plant should provide 
certain reactive power and reserve power and join voltage 
and frequency regulation without payment. Later on a 
compensation method will be worked out. 
* Bilateral transaction is limited to large consumers 
and power plants as test right now. It will be gradually 
increase. Currently only machines at or above 200MW are 
in the market. Later on it can be generators at or above 
100MW. 
* Ancillary service market is under consideration. 
Competition among discos and the transition of the 
market from single buyer to wholesale mode are also 
under consideration. But these will commit only when the 
current market operates well and experiences have been 
cumulated enough. 
 
B.  R&D for future Northwest Regional Power Market 
The Northwest Grid covers four provinces or 
autonomous region. They are Shan-xi, Gan-su, Ning-xia 
 and Qing-hai. Its area is about one seventh of China. By 
the end of 2003, the total generation capacity is 20GW 
with 65% thermal and 35% hydraulic power. However the 
economic development is quite unbalanced in the region, 
relatively rich in Shan-xi and poor in Qing-hai. Hence the 
electricity prices are quite different in the two areas. The 
upper Yellow river provides rich hydraulic resources. 
However the request of nevegation, irrigation and floor 
protection, which is controlled by certain official 
organization, may significantly reduce the profits of 
hydraulic power plants and bring about difficulties in 
day-to-day dispatch. Another issue is caused by larger 
area and lower population density, which means more 
transmission system investment. The western area 
hydraulic power and eastern area thermal power can be 
dispatched properly to yield most economic benefits. The 
peak load time difference between western and eastern 
areas also asks for large amount of power transfer 
between east and west parts. However currently relative 
weak network may lead to severe congestion and relevant 
market power if power market is committed. The region is 
going to interconnect to N. China and Central China Grids 
to sell electricity to the two regions. 
Based on the facts mentioned above, NW Grid 
Company is actively conducting R&D towards future 
power market operation. Three R&D projects have been 
implemented with the help of universities. The three 
projects covered the following three aspects respectively 
(i) overall market structure, market operation mode and 
market rule etc.; (ii) pricing mechanism and grid average 
transmission cost estimation; and (iii) Potential risks and 
their mitigations in the NW Regional Power Market. The 
last project was jointly implemented by the University of 
Hong Kong and NW Power Grid Company. 
All the R&D projects examined the characteristics of 
the Grid thoroughly and made valuable qualitative and 
quantitative suggestions on future power market operation. 
Experiences and lessons from world power market 
practices are also considered in-depth, which laid a solid 
foundation for future successful operation of the power 
market and secure and reliable operation of the power 
system. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, special considerations on power system 
deregulation in the developing countries in Asia are 
discussed. Northeast and Northwest Grids of China are 
used as examples to show the applications of such 
considerations in real power markets. 
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